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The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on
Contributions to Political Committees in
the 1976 Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo1 partially dismantled the electoral reform program formulated in the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.2 The Court
declared that the Act's limitations on expenditures by candidates and
independent expenditures in federal elections unconstitutionally burdened political speech and association, while it upheld restrictions on
contributions to candidates.
After five months of deliberation, Congress attempted to salvage its
design for electoral reform by enacting the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976. 3 Responding to Buckley's approval of
restrictions on political contributions, Congress imposed new limits
on "contributions" to political committees. 4 This Note argues that,
under the framework of analysis employed by the Court in Buckley,
the 1976 Amendments' limitations on contributions to political committees are unconstitutional.
I.

The 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments

The 1976 Amendments impose various limits on contributions by
personsi to federal candidates. The Act defines "contribution" broadly
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Buckley v. Valeo has received much attention in
the legal literature. E.g., Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its
Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign
Financing,29 VAND. L. REv. 1327 (1976); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); Young, Supreme Court Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 362, 362-63
(1976); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 58, 171-96 (1976); Comment,
Buckley v. Valco: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 852 (1976); Comment, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v.
Valco, 25 EMORY L.J. 400 (1976); Comment, Campaign Finance in Wisconsin After
Buckley, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 816.
2. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 1436 (88 Stat. 1263) (amending Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
3. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. &-AD. NEvs (90 Stat. 475).
4. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(C), (2)(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
5. The term "person" includes "an individual, partnership, committee, association,
corporation, labor organization, and any other organization or group of persons." Id.
§ 431(h); see Federal Election Commission (FEC) Proposed Regulation § 100.13, 41 Fed.
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to include disbursements of money and transfers of things of value for
the purpose of influencing federal elections.6 Individuals, political
committees and associations may contribute no more than $1,000 per
election "to any candidate and his authorized committees." 7 A "multicandidate political committee" may contribute a total of $5,000 per
candidate per election."
The 1976 Amendments also restrict contributions to political committees not authorized by a federal candidate. Contributions to
political committees "established and maintained" by a national political party may not exceed $15,000 from any multicandidate committee or $20,000 from any other person.' 0 Furthermore, no individual or organization may give more than $5,000 per year "to any
other political committee."" Finally, the Amendments limit total
contributions to candidates and committees by any individual to
12
$25,000 per calendar year.
This Note scrutinizes the restrictions upon contributions to political
committees. A "political committee" is defined statutorily as "any
committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives
contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." 13 This Note also focuses upon
the annual $25,000 ceiling for all contributions by an individual. The
1976 Amendments use no terms to distinguish contributions made to
a candidate from contributions made to a political committee. For the
Reg. 35932, 35937 (1976) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-146.1) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as Regulation]. The Proposed Regulations were made final, with
minor amendments, by an FEC announcement or April 13, 1977, after a 30-day Congressional review period. 42 Fed. Reg. 19324 (1977).
6. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
7. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 110.1(a)(1). The
FEC interprets a candidate's "authorized committee" to be a "political committee which
is empowered in writing by a candidate to solicit or receive contributions or make
expenditures on behalf of the candidate," or whose activiiy on his behalf has not been
disavowed. Id. § 100.14(b)(1).
8. A "multicandidate political committee" is a "political committee which has been
registered ... for a period of not less than 6 months, which has received contributions
from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has
made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office." 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(4)
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 100.14(a)(3).
9. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 110.2(a)(1).
10. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(B), (1)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation §§
110.2(a)(2), 110.1(b)(4). For purposes of these sections, the FEC defines "political committees established and maintained by a national political party" as (1) the national committee; (2) the House campaign committee; and (3) the Senate campaign committee." Id.
§§ 110.l(b)(2), 110.2(a)(2)(ii).
11. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(C), (2)(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation §§ 110.1
(c), 110.2(a)(3).
12. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 110.5(a).
13. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(d) (Vest Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 100.14.
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sake of analysis, gifts of money or anything of value to a candidate or
his authorized committees and agents will be referred to as "candidate
contributions"; gifts or transfers to unauthorized political committees,
both party and nonparty, will be referred to as "donations."
II.

Political Spending and First Amendment Values

A.

Buckley's Classification: Contributions and
Independent Expenditures

The legislation confronting the Buckley Court was similar to the
1976 Amendments. The 1974 Amendments imposed the same $1,000
and $5,000 limitations upon contributions to a candidate 4 and restricted total annual contributions by an individual to $25,000.15 In
addition, the 1974 Act placed a ceiling of $1,000 per year upon "independent expenditures" made "relative to a clearly identified
candidate."16
The Buckley Court upheld the contribution limitations of the
1974 Act, but struck down the limits imposed upon independent expenditures. 17 Its analysis of the provisions began by distinguishing the
First Amendment values implicated by the acts of contributing and
spending independently.' 8 The Court recognized that both contributions and independent expenditures constitute forms of expression that
come within the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. The
act of contributing communicates the contributor's general support
for the recipient candidate. 19 Similarly, the independent spender expresses his political beliefs by advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.2 0 Furthermore, both contributions and
independent expenditures are forms of political association. A contribution or an independent expenditure made relative to a candidate
affiliates the contributor or spender with that candidate. 21
Nevertheless, the court found fundamental differences in the expressive and associational properties of contributions and independent
14. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 U.S.C.A.
44Ia(a)(1)(A) (vest Cum. Supp. 1977) ($1,000 limit); compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)
($5,000 limit).
15. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 US.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976).
17. See 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (per curiam).
18. See id. at 19-23.
19. Id. at 21.
20. See id. at 39, 40, 48.
21. Id. at 22.
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expenditures. The Buckley Court concluded that contributions function merely as vicarious speech.2 2 Although a contribution may symbolize the contributor's support for a candidate, it does not articulate
precisely the political sentiments or opinions underlying the gift. Only
in the hands and at the behest of the recipient candidate will such
articulate expression be realized.2 3 As symbolic speech, a contribution's
24
expressive capacity "does not increase perceptively with [its] size."
At most, contribution restrictions inhibit only the demonstration of
the intensity of a contributor's support; they do not affect the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 25 Furthermore,
although contribution ceilings curb one important means of associating with a candidate or a committee, they leave untrammeled the
right of membership and active participation in an association and
do not hinder the ability of candidates and associations to gather large
sums of money for effective advocacy. 26 Ceilings on contributions,
then, do not significantly curtail the contributor's individual expression and association, the core values of the First Amendment.
The Buckley Court described an independent expenditure, on the
other hand, as a means of facilitating the spender's own political
speech.27 Therefore, limitations upon independent expenditures directly restrict the degree to which the spender can speak autonomously.
Particularly because of "[t]he electorate's increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information,"2 1
any exacting restriction necessarily burdens use of the most effective
29
forms of political expression.
Limits on independent expenditures also impinge on freedom of
association. The Act's restrictions applied to organizations as well as
individuals, and thus constrained an organization's ability to spend
resources for its members' political expression. The independent expenditure ceiling, the Court held, "precludes most associations from
effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis
for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of
association." 30
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id. at 19-20, 39. The Court provided an illustration of an expenditure made
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" as a single one-quarter page advertisement
which a person or association might place in a major metropolitan newspaper to advocate
a particular candidate's election. Id. at 40.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 19-20.
30. Id. at 22.
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B.

Donations: A Third Classification

By classifying disbursements or transfers to unauthorized political
committees (donations)3 1 as "contributions," the 1976 Amendments
draw these transactions into the category of spending constitutionally
regulated under the 1974 Amendments. 32 Congress, however, may not
regulate political campaign activities as it chooses by the mere use of
labels. To be sure, donations can be distinguished from independent
expenditures in form: the independent spender speaks for himself
whereas the donor does not directly finance expression. Yet, this does
not compel the classification of donations as contributions. The constitutional significance of donations turns upon the strength of the
First Amendment values attached to this mode of expression and association. Analysis must begin, as in Buckley, with the recognition of
the burden on core First Amendment rights imposed by restrictions
on donations.
Buckley acknowledged that "the original basis for the recognition
31. An analysis of donations immediately must exclude contributions to any committee
authorized by a candidate or unauthorized but acting as an intermediary or a conduit on
behalf of a candidate. These are regarded correctly under the Act and FEC regulations
as indirect contributions to a candidate. See pp. 968-69 infra.
32. One might argue that donations constitute "expenditures" within the meaning
of 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), rather than "contributions." So classified,
donations would not be subject to the $5,000 limit on "contributions" to political committees. See id. § 44la(a)(1)(C), (2)(C).
This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with statutory language and Congressional intent. First, donations clearly come within the statutory definition of "contribution" as gifts of money or anything of value made to influence federal elections. Id.
§ 431(e). Were donations construed to be "expenditures," the provisions in the 1976
Amendments restricting "contributions" to political committees would be rendered
meaningless and totally inoperative.
Second, the uses of the words "contribution" and "expenditure" throughout the Act
argue against this interpretation. Contributions are viewed as payments or transfers that
permit the recipient to control the future purposes and applications of the funds. Expenditures, on the other hand, connote direct purchases of goods or services for political
campaigns, purchases which are controlled by the spender. With this taxonomy, donations must be viewed as contributions to a political committee which the committee uses
to make expenditures. The statutory definitions of contributions and expenditures overlap
to some extent, but there are revealing differences. Whereas the definition of "contribution" incudes "a gift, subscription, loan . . . of money or anything of value," id. § 431
(e)(1), the term "expenditure" designates "a purchase, payment, distribution ... of money
or anything of value." Id. § 431(f(1).
Other provisions seem to treat donations as contributions. A political committee is defined as an entity "which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar
year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." Id. § 431(d). Similarly, the Act requires
a political committee treasurer to account for "all contributions made to or for such
committee" and "all expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee" but does
not mention expenditures made to such committee. Id. § 432(c)(1), (3). Furthermore,
political committee reports must disclose "the total sum of individual contributions made
to or for such committee .. .during the reporting period," id. § 434(b)(3), and "the total
sum of expenditures made by such committee," id. § 434(b)(9).
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of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association" was the
function of political committees in "effectively amplifying the voice
34
of their adherents." 33 The Court relied on Sweezy v. New Hampshire
and NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson,3 5 the first of a line of precedents that established an individual's First Amendment right to
effective political speech through participation in an effective political
organization."8 Since NAACP v. Alabama, it is an established constitutional tenet that a political party committee or any other political
committee "is but the medium through which its individual members
seek to make more effective the expression of their own views." 37 In
essence, the collective expression of a political committee, existing as
the aggregate of its members, is the extension of the individual speech
38
of its members.
33. 424 U.S. at 22.
34. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). Sweezy recognized: "Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association. . . . Exercise'of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations." Id. at 250.
35. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (Illinois statute which prohibits
person from voting in a primary of a political party if he has voted in primary of
another party within preceding 23 months violates right to associate effectively with
political party of one's choice); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia statute
prohibiting NAACP from urging blacks to seek legal redress for violation of their civil
rights unjustifiably invades the First Amendment rights of the NAACP's members);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (local ordinances requiring disclosure of
NAACP membership lists impermissibly burdens free association).
37. 357 U.S. at 459. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106, 143-44 (1948), described the "guaranty of freedom of assembly" as
a liberty essentially coordinate with the freedoms of speech, the press, and conscience.
... It is not by accident, it is by explicit design .... that these freedoms are coupled
together in the First Amendment's assurance. They involve the right to hear as well
as to speak, and any restriction upon either attenuates both.
There is therefore an effect in restricting expenditures for the publicizing of
political views not inherently present in restricting other types of expenditure,
namely, that it necessarily deprives the electorate, the persons entitled to hear, as
well as the author of the utterance, whether an individual or a group, of the advantage of free and full discussion and of the right of free assembly for that purpose.
38. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (effective advocacy of both public and private
viewpoints undeniably enhanced by association). Professor Thomas I. Emerson asserts:
[It is clear from the functions served by association in a democratic society that
associational expression should be entitled to the same complete protection as individual expression. Organization primarily supplies the mechanism for reaching a
wider audience. It does not change the character of expression as the communication
of beliefs, opinions, information and ideas, or its content. Thus associational expression is simply an extension of the individual right of expression and, for the
same reasons and to the same extent, should be free of governmental abridgment.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 432 (1970). The Supreme Court's
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (dictum), essentially adopts
Professor Emerson's position. The right of association, it explains,
is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's
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The nature of collective expression does not support Congress's
denomination of donations as "contributions." Disregarding the potential for symbolic communication, a contribution's expressive value
will be realized by someone other than the contributor. A donation,
however, involves the donor's own speech. The donor does not give
money in order that someone else speak; he constitutes a part of that
which is speaking.
Naturally, the extent to which the expression of a political committee can be identified as the speech of a particular donor depends
upon the size and organizational structure of the particular committee
and the donor's relationship to the committee. Where X and Y
organize a "Committee of Two" to make independent expenditures
toward purchasing newspaper space for advertisements that they have
jointly written and signed, the committee's expression clearly constitutes the speech of X and y.39 This equivalence weakens, however, as the political committee acquires an impersonal, bureaucratic
identity of its own, and as the donor is further removed from its
governing center.
But even with larger, formally structured committees, association
may conceivably be the single available means for certain persons to
speak effectively. If the electorate's dependence on mass media for
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it ...
Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not
expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful.
39. The two-person independent spending committee is not hypothetical; the FEC's
files include several examples. For instance, two women formed the "Ad Hoc Committee
Concerned for Life" in order to place an advertisement in the Long Island Catholic
supporting Senator James Buckley. The committee's letter to the FEC stated that the
advertisement cost $660 and "was not authorized by Senator Buckley or any political
comtihittee associated with him." Letter from Patricia Corry and Carolyn Dlugozima to
Federal Election Commission (Oct. 26, 1976) (FEC microfilm location 76FEC/037/1692).
Similarly, four Californians contributed $1,103.68 to the Mid-Peninsula Environmentalists
for Carter Committee which spent the funds for advertisements in local newspapers.
Letter from Robert Girard to Federal Election Committee (Dec. 2, 1976) (FEC microfilm
location 76FEC/044/0972). For other examples of small independent spending committees, see, e.g., Report of Independent Expenditures or Contributions By Persons, FEC
Form filed by Daniel Patrick Moynihan for Senate (Jan. 10, 1977) (FEC microfilm location
77FEC/046/1719) (30 persons donate total of $699 expended for several local newspaper
and radio advertisements); Report of Independent Expenditures or Contributions By
Persons, FEC form filed by Young Business and Professional Men & Women for President
Ford (Nov. 2, 1976) (FEC microfilm location 76FEC/038/1085) (80 donors; donations range
from SI to $25); Letter from Hal F. Broughton, Chairman, Concerned Oregon Citizens
Committee to Federal Election Commission (Oct. 29, 1976) (FEC microfilm location
76FEC/038/0031) (single $2,322 expenditure for newspaper advertisement); Letter from
Vernon Stout, Chairman, Hughes County Voters Interested in the Peace, Freedom, and
Prosperity of Our Country* to Federal Election Commission (Jan. 7, 1977) (FEC microfilm location 77FEC/045/2380) (five donations totaling $125.16 expended for single
advertisement in Holdenville, Oklahoma, daily newspaper).
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campaign news and information has, in fact, made these modes of
political communication indispensable, 40 then the collective voice may
be essential, especially in large metropolitan areas where television
time or newspaper space is expensive. 41 It has been suggested that
persons who cannot afford bold political advertisements may refrain
entirely from independent speech, deciding that weak expressive impact cannot justify any expense. 42 Moreover, the packaging of a
political advertisement is as important to the speaker's message as the
eloquence of the written word.4 3 Thus, even where money is not a
concern, lack of literary talent or the time necessary to create and
disseminate autonomous speech may discourage independent expenditures. Depending upon these conditions and others, such as availability of media outlets and the size of the audience, persons may
decide that donations to those committees espousing their political
beliefs, although not as personal a form of expression as independent
expenditures, will alone "speak" with consequence. 44 Limits on donations therefore may stifle the effective expression of those who lack
sufficient monetary or personal resources. Furthermore, ceilings on
individual donations to committees directly obstruct the committees'
purpose in "effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents" 4
insofar as their expressive capacity depends upon donations from
their supporters.
Therefore, donations to political committees do not fit precisely
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
41. For example, the Buckley Court noted that, as of January 1, 1975, one full-page
advertisement in a daily edition of a certain metropolitan newspaper cost ;6,971.04. Id.
at 20 n.20.
42. Hollihan, The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: The Constitutionality of Limiting Political Advertising by the Non-Candidate, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
266, 283 (1975).
43. The Supreme Court has noted that effective speech serves "a dual communicative function," conveying both "ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,"
as well as "otherwise inexpressible emotions." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
(state may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the mere
public display of an expletive a criminal offense). A message's cognitive and emotive
force depends upon the manner in which it is transmitted. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands in
opposition to Viet Nam war).
44. The fact that collective political advocacy often proves more feasible and influential than autonomous speech was underscored in Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp.
248, 258 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (prosecutor's attempt to compel
disclosure of contributors to Republican campaign fund violated associational rights of
contributors):
For better or for worse, the only means, apart from voting, whereby most people
can participate effectively in politics is to affiliate themselves with a political party
and to make fipancial contributions thereto according to their respective means and
inclinations.
45. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam).
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Buckley's characterization of either independent expenditures or contributions. Arguably, the First Amendment accords stronger protection
to donations than it does to candidate contributions, because donations
to political committees bind up varying degrees of individual speech
with association. Under the analysis of Buckley, their regulation
burdens core First Amendment values more severely than do contribution limitations. Yet, donations do not implicate these values to the
same extent as totally autonomous expression through independent
expenditures. Rather, donations must be considered as a third classification. When examining the First Amendment protection that
ought to be extended to donations, they must be analyzed on their
own terms. Congress cannot ensure the constitutionality of its limits
on donations simply by labeling donations "contributions."
III. The 1976 Amendments and the First Amendment
A.

Strict Scrutiny under Buckley v. Valeo

The Buckley Court explicitly applied strict standards in scrutinizing
the limitations on contributions and independent expenditures in the
1974 Amendments. The Court held that contributions constitute one
important aspect of association, 46 and that "governmental 'action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.'
Similarly, the constitutionality of
the independent expenditure restriction turned "on whether the
governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of
' 4
political expression.
Although the Court noted that the Act's "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of
political expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions,"' 4 9 it did not develop two distinct tests or levels of
scrutiny by which to judge the restrictions." ° After identifying First
",47

46. Id.
47. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958)).
48. Id. at 44-45.
49. Id. at 23.
50. It has been suggested erroneously that in Buckley v. Valeo the Court developed and
applied two distinct scrutiny tests to examine the state interests for regulating contributions and independent expenditures. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 56, 178-79 (1976). Were the editors of the Harvard Law Review correct in their
analysis of Buckley, the burdens upon First Amendment rights imposed by limitations on
donations, see pp. 959-60 supra, would justify use of the stricter test.
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Amendment infringement sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, the
Court determined, first, whether substantial governmental interests
existed for regulation. If they existed, the Court then looked to whether
the regulatory provisions directly and narrowly served these interests.
Finally, the Court inquired whether the government's objectives could
not be achieved by other means that intruded less upon First Amendment values. Only by satisfying all three stages could the challenged
restrictions be sustained.
1. Candidate Contributions
The Court found that "the Act's primary purpose"-to limit the
actuality and appearance of quid pro quo arrangements between a
contributor and a candidate-constituted a substantial governmental
interest in contribution limitations.51 The Court observed that corruption caused by a candidate's dependence upon the support of
contributors to launch expensive campaigns undermines the integrity
of American representative democracy.5 - The appearance of corruption, arising from the public awareness of the opportunities for abuse,
erodes confidence in the representative system. 53 Thus, the Court
held that Congress's interests in stemming the reality and semblance
54
of quid pro quo abuse were substantial.
Moreover, the Act's regulatory "means" centered directly and narrowly upon the government's "ends." Restrictions on contributions
focused "precisely upon the problem of large campaign contributionsthe narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and
potential for corruption have been identified." 5 Clearly, ceilings on
51. 424 U.S. at 26. The Buckley Court indicated that it was "unnecessary to look
beyond the Act's primary purpose . . . in order to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id. The Court noted, however, two
"ancillary" interests asserted by the state to justify the contribution limitations: equalizing the financial "voice" of all citizens in the electoral process and braking the "skyrocketing" cost of political campaigns. Id. at 25-26. Only in its discussion of the independent expenditure limitation did the Court consider the constitutional legitimacy of
these "ancillary" purposes for restriction of financial political activity. The Court
authoritatively rejected the first reason because "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 48-49. Regarding the second
rationale, the Court held that "the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns
in and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of
campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal campaigns." Id.
at 57. Therefore, the sole governmental interest for regulation of either contributions or
independent expenditures that the Court recognized as substantial was the prevention of
quid pro quo corruption between a contributor and a candidate.
52. Id. at 25-27.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 28.
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contributions mitigate the potential for actual quid pro quo corruption. The Court did not assume that all large contributors seek improper influence over a future officeholder5 6 it recognized that contribution limitations may prove somewhat overinclusive as a means of
stemming actual abuse. But the Court concluded that the statute was
not overbroad because it furthered the legitimate objective of reducing
the appearance of corruption: a limit on contributions dispels "the
appearance of impropriety" by eliminating the opportunity for corruption "inherent in the process of raising large monetary contribu57
tions."
Applying the third tier of scrutiny, the Court did not find less
intrusive alternative means to achieve the government's objectives.
Criminal laws prohibiting bribery fall short in stemming actual corruption because they are effective against "only the most blatant and
specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action." r8s Furthermore, the Court accepted Congress's conclusion that
disclosure obligations deal inadequately with the reality or appearance
of electoral abuse.59 Therefore, regulation of contributions to candidates met Buckley's strict scrutiny standards. 60
2.

Independent Expenditures
In contrast, the independent expenditure ceiling could not be
justified. The restraint did clear the first barrier in Buckley's strict
scrutiny test. The Supreme Court acknowledged Congress's intent to
"maximiz[e] the effectiveness of the .

contribution limitations" by

expenditures. 61

restricting independent
The provision purported to
close loopholes through which spending on a candidate's behalf might
be made with the semblance of independence. 62- Insofar as "loophole
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id. at 29-30.
58. Id. at 27-28.
59. Id. at 28.
60. The Court also upheld the $25,000 ceiling on total contributions by an individual
in a calendar year as "no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution
limitation." Id. at 38; see pp. 971-73 infra.
61. 424 U.S. at 44.
62. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, after alluding to evidence of
widespread circumvention of the 1974 Amendments' contribution limits by many "independent committees," had upheld the independent expenditure limitation as **a
necessary and constitutional means of closing a loophole that would otherwise destroy
the effectiveness" of the individual contribution restrictions. Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d
821, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afrd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
The court gave credence to the government's argument that "[a)n expenditure may
obviously inure to the benefit of a candidate even though . . . the candidate was not in
control of the expenditure or of the goods or services purchased." Id. at 852-53.
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closing" aimed to prevent actual or apparent corruption, regulation of
independent expenditures supported a substantial governmental pur0' 4
pose, 3 the "primary interest served ... by the Act as a whole.
The independent expenditure limitation failed, however, to focus
directly and narrowly upon elimination of such abuse. The Court
found that the ceiling suffered from gross overbreadth. First, the
restriction was clearly unnecessary as a means of reaching potentially
corruptive spending on behalf of a candidate, such as expenditures controlled by or coordinated with a candidate or his campaign committee.
The Court interpreted the 1974 Amendments to treat these expenditures as contributions to that candidate, rather than as independent
expenditures.0 3 Second, the restriction burdened political activity
which has little corruptive potential. Independent expenditures, by
their lack of prearrangement or coordination, do not have "virtually
the same value to the candidate" as a contribution. 0 Where the
spender speaks himself, his expenditures "may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive."0' 7 The absence of an actual candidate-contributor relation "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."0 8 The lack
of a visible associational link vitiates the appearance of corruption.
The Court also found the independent expenditure limitation to be
unconstitutionally underinclusive. In order to avoid impermissible
vagueness, the Court construed the provision "to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the
63. In examining the governmental interests supporting restriction of independent
expenditures, the Court stated:
The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by [the independent expenditure limit] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations ...
• . . We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify [the] ceiling on independent expenditures.
424 U.S. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
This statement suggests that the Court did not find the prevention of corruption a
substantial enough interest in and of itself for the independent expenditure ceiling to
pass the first of the strict scrutiny standards. Such a conclusion cannot be justified since
the Court found the same governmental purpose to be sufficient in the context of
candidate contribution limits. The Court's reasoning here can be reconciled with its
previous analysis if the passage is read to mean that the limit on independent expenditures "inadequately" promotes the substantial interest in preventing corruption because,
as is demonstrated in the opinion, it fails the second and third strict scrutiny stages.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Id. at 46 n.53.
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id.
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election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 9 Redefined in
this manner, the ceiling would not apply to messages of advocacy
phrased in less explicit terms. The Court stated:
It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness
of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that
they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted
the restriction on express advocacy of election
or defeat but
70
nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign.
The Court concluded that "no substantial societal interest would be
served by a loophole-closing provision.. . that permitted unscrupulous
persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order
to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office."' 7 1
Because the independent expenditure limitations thus failed to
focus directly and narrowly upon the government's interests, the Court
declared the restriction unconstitutional. It did not, therefore, proceed
to a consideration of other less intrusive means of "loophole closing."
B.

Donations and Strict Scrutiny

Prior analysis established that donations implicate the fundamental
First Amendment values of an individual's association with a political
committee, his expression through the committee, and the committee's
capacity for amplifying the speech of its members. As donations merit
at least the constitutional protection afforded candidate contributions,
regulation of donations must pass muster under the same strict scrutiny
test which Buckley applied to both contributions and independent
expenditures.
1.

Substantial Governmental Interests in Regulation

Limitations upon donations reflect Congress's intent to mend the
network of election reforms lacerated by repeal of the independent
expenditure limitation. The legislative history of the 1976 Amendments indicates that the central interest underlying the limitations is
that of the former independent expenditure provision.7 2 Ceilings upon
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 45.
71. Id.
72. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee on the 1976
Amendments asserted three rationales for ceilings upon donations:
[F]irst, these limits restrict the opportunity to circumvent the $1,000 and $5,000
limits on contributions to a candidate; second, these limits serve to assure that
candidates' reports reveal the root source of the contributions the candidate has
received; and third, these limitations minimize the adverse impact on the statutory
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donations are designed to restrict the opportunity to circumvent contribution limits through gifts to unauthorized committees. Conceivable
examples of such evasion include donations to committees likely to
contribute to a particular candidate, donations to "dummy" committees established and controlled by the donor, and donations directed
to a particular candidate through intermediaries. To the extent that
the objective of the donation limits is the prevention of actual or
apparent corruption, the same substantial state purpose that supported limitations on contributions and independent expenditures"3
supports regulation of donations.
2.

Direct and Narrow Focus
The limitations do not survive, however, the second stage of Buckley's strict scrutiny, that regulation be narrowly drawn to achieve the
government's ends.
The 1976 Amendments are. radically overinclusive as a means of
stemming actual and apparent corruption because they regulate the
relationship between a political committee and its donors, and not
the relationship between donors and the candidates benefited. This
can be seen most clearly by considering political committees organized
solely to make independent expenditures. 74 The government's purscheme caused by political committees that appear to be separate entities pursuing
their own ends, but are actually a means for advancing a candidate's campaign.
H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 57-58 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEivs 946, 972-73. The third rationale merely restates the first reason: the
need to prevent evasion of the candidate contribution limitations. The second rationalereporting root sources-appears to have no logical connection to limits on donations.
The 1976 Amendments and regulations include explicit disclosure requirements which
serve this goal. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 432(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (requiring treasurer of
political committee to record the identity of persons who contribute in excess of $50); id.
§ 434(b) (requiring political committees and candidates to file periodic reports with the
FEC disclosing the identity of all persons contributing more than $100 within any
calendar year); Regulation §§ 102.9, 104.2. The proffered purposes of the donation
limitations, therefore, condense into a single objective: to close loopholes in the candidate contribution ceilings.
73. See pp. 962, 963-64 supra.
74. For example, a committee may be established only to pool the resources of individuals who anticipate placing newspaper advertisements that advocate the election or
defeat of identified federal candidates. See note 39 supra. The FEC has explicitly interpreted the limitation on donations to include such donations to committees "making
independent expenditures." Regulation § 110.1(d).
FEC records demonstrate that independent spending committees channel substantial
funds into the electoral campaign pipeline. During the 1976 elections, 38 committees
spending in support of convention delegates and not authorized by any presidential candidate ("unauthorized delegate committees") and 39 committees making independent expenditures filed reports with the Commission disclosing their disbursements advocating
the election or defeat of federal candidates. FEC, FEC Disclosure Series, No. 3: Index of
Independent Expenditures by Individuals and Receipts and Expenditures by Un-
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pose in restricting donations to such committees must depend upon
its interest in regulating the committees' eventual use of their funds,
for the act of donating per se is certainly of no interest in the regulation of campaigns. Congress's primary concern is the possible corruptive influence of the committees' expenditures. But, as Buckley
authoritatively pronounced, 75 there is not a sufficient means-ends relation to justify limitation of independent expenditures by a person
or a committee. There can, therefore, be no sufficient justification
to limit donations that fund expenditures that cannot be constitutionally regulated. If a person's independent speech cannot be restricted
constitutionally, neither can his speech through association.7 6
Even where political committees contribute to candidates, the focus
upon the donor-committee relationship produces unconstitutional
overbreadth. First, political committees themselves are restricted by
candidate contribution ceilings. 77 Thus, even if a particular donor
were to give millions to a political committee, the actual corruptive
potential of his donations could not exceed the potential permitted by
limits on committee contributions to a candidate. Second, the appearance of corruption is ameliorated if a political committee has many
donors; the recipient candidate, and the public at large, cannot determine with any certainty the individual source of the candidate's
contribution from the committee.78 The political committee in effect
authorized Delegates, 1976 Campaign, at 3, 40-61 (March 1977) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) (number of independent expending committees derived by examination of list
of independent spenders, pp. 40-61). The unauthorized delegate committees reported
donations of $305,462 and expenditures of $295,613. Id. at 3. The independent expending
committees reported S29,281 of expenditures. Id. at 40-61 (calculated from figures listed).
Of course, due to ignorance of reporting requirements, these figures may understate the
total amount actually spent independently during the 1976 elections. They may also reflect
a lower than desired level of spending due to the 1976 Amendments' limitations on
donations. FEC data is not yet available for independent expenditures during the 1976
elections by active multicandidate committees and other committees contributing to
candidates.
75. See pp. 964-65 supra.
76. For a general discussion of the unconstitutionality of limitations on donations to
independently expending committees, see Testimony of John Bolton II before the Federal
Election Commission on Proposed Regulations: Part 109 ("Independent Expenditures"),
at 8-12 (June 9, 1976) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal) (appearing on behalf of the
American Conservative Union and Mr. Stewart R. Mott); and Clagett & Bolton, supra
note 1, at 1364-67.
77. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1), (2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
78. The inability of candidates to identify the original sources of their contributions
from political committees would appear to increase as the size of the contributing committees increases. Donors to multicandidate committees (which by definition have more
than fifty donors, see note 8 supra) seem particularly well-insulated. As of February 9,
1977, 1377 active multicandidate political committees not established by a political party
organization had filed reports with the FEC. Telephone Inteview with Susan Tifft, FEC
Assistant Press Secretary (Feb. 9, 1977) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
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insulates its donors from actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements
with the candidate.
Admittedly, corruptive potential may inhere in contributions by a
political -ommittee that is totally or primarily the instrument of a
single donor or an interest group composed of easily identifiable
donors. But the limitations on donations prove underinclusive as a
means of regulating this potential abuse. A donor could easily circumvent the ceiling on candidate contributions by giving funds to as
many "dummy" committees as he could establish; these committees
could then funnel his donations to the desired candidates.7 9 The
1976 Amendments' restrictions on donations to any one "dummy"
committee do not prevent the actuality or appearance of electoral
corruption. 80 As the Buckley Court recognized, ceilings upon contributions alone do not foreclose evasion through proliferation of
political committees under common control. 8 '
Therefore, regulation of donations does not focus directly and
narrowly on the government's interests in loophole-closing. Although,
as Buckley determined, there is a substantial governmental interest in
restricting the contributions of political committees to candidates, this
interest cannot mechanically justify limitations upon donations.
3.

Less Intrusive Alternative Means

The final test enunciated in Buckley requires an examination of
less intrusive alternative means by which the government may achieve
its objectives. Such means, in fact, already exist: several provisions of
the Act and Federal Election Commission (FEC) rulings focus directly
and narrowly upon circumvention of the candidate contribution
limits. They construct a "cordon sanitaire" around the candidate, a
legal bulwark against sham transactions, without intruding upon First
Amendment liberties to the extent that those liberties are impinged
upon by direct limits on donations.
Donations to a committee authorized by a candidate to accept
contributions on his behalf are deemed "contributions made to such
candidate,"8' 2 and will apply against the donor's contribution limit
79. The $25,000 ceiling upon an individual's annual contributions, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), renders the ceiling on donations underinclusive only to
the extent of $5,000 donations to five committees, $1,000 donations to 25 committees, or
any similar variation. But see pp. 971-73 infra.
80. Viewed as a whole, the Act operates to stem this abuse through the constructive
contribution and nonproliferation provisions of the 1976 Amendments and the FEC
regulations. See pp. 969-70 infra. The limits on donations by themselves, however, prove
underinclusive in stemming the abuse that they were purportedly enacted to prevent.
81. 424 U.S. at 28 n.31.
82. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(7)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
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with respect to the candidate. 3 Even if the recipient committee is not
authorized by a candidate to receive contributions, any donations
made "on behalf of a particular candidate" or "in any way earmarked
or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit" will also be
considered contributions to be applied against the donor's limitation
with respect to the candidate.3 4 FEC regulations further bolster the
candidate contribution limits. They permit a person to contribute the
maximum directly to a candidate and to donate to committees likely
to support that candidate only if (1) the committees are not authorized
by the candidate or do not contribute solely to that candidate; (2) the
donor does not give with the knowledge that a substantial portion of
his donations will be contributed to that candidate; or (3) the donor
does not otherwise retain control over the funds given. s
The Act also attempts to thwart opportunities for abuse arising
from political committee expenditures that appear independent but
are actually coordinated with a candidate's campaign. Any expenditure
by a person made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or
at the request or suggestion of" the candidate, his authorized committees or agents, constitutes a contribution to the candidate 6 to be
applied against that person's contribution limitST
83. See id. § 441a(a)(l)(A), (2)(A); Regulation §§ ll0.1(a)(1), l10.2(a)(l). The statute
does not explicitly refer to donations made to political committees authorized to make
expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate. The FEC regulations define such a
committee as an "authorized committee." See id. § 100.14(b)(1). Hence, donations to these
committees presumably would also come within the $1,000 or $5,000 candidate contribution ceilings. A contrary conclusion would permit a person to evade his candidate contribution limit by funding the activities performed by a committee on that candidate's
behalf.
Donations to a candidate's authorized expending committee may also come with the
purview of 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), which treats funds directed to
a candidate through an "intermediary or conduit" as a contribution to the candidate.
84. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 110.6. The
regulations define "earmarked" as "a designation, instruction, or encumbrance (including
those which are direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written) which results in
all or part of a contribution or expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf of, a
clearly identified candidate or a candidate's authorized committee." Id. § 110.6(b).
85. Regulation § 110.1(h). It may be argued that a flat limit on donations, even if
overbroad, may be enforced more easily than the "indirect," "earmarked," and "constructive" contribution provisions requiring analysis of contributor-candidate relations.
But the FEC will face the same enforcement difficulties, even with donation ceilings,
because the other provisions are necessary to make effective the candidate contribution
limits. Even if the donation limits curb significant evasion, this alone cannot justify the
heavy burden that regulation of donations places upon vital speech and association with
political committees. Cf. United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d
1135, 1141-42 (2d Cir. 1972) (First Amendment requires a narrow construction of "expenditure" and "contribution" under 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, a construction which admittedly impedes enforcement).
86. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 109.1(a), (c).
87. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), see Regulations §§ 110.1
(a)(1), UO0.2(a)(1).
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Finally, the 1976 Amendments contain "nonproliferation" provisions. These prevent evasion of the candidate contribution ceilings by
persons who create multiple "dummy" committees through which
contributions can be directed to a particular candidate. For purposes
of the candidate contribution limitations, all political committees
"established or financed or maintained or controlled" by the same
corporation, labor organization or any other person (including all
parent, subsidiaries, branches, divisions or departments or local units)
are considered a single political committee entitled to contribute only
$1,000 or $5,000 to a federal candidate. For example, where X creates
and controls committees A, B, and C and donates $5,000 to each, the
committees together can contribute only .1,000 to a particular candidate. 88 For organizations not specified in the statute, the FEC has
developed indicia to determine whether a political committee is
established, financed, maintained or controlled by a single individual
or organization. 9
88. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); see Regulation § 100.3.
Proliferation of political committees as a device for evasion had been recognized as a
significant problem by the FEC in its early r'ulemaking. In Advisory Opinion 1975-45, 40
Fed. Reg. 53722 (1975), the Commission held that the multicandidate committees
established, funded, and staffed by the Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust
could not be regarded as exercising independent judgment in the selection of federal
candidates to whom they would contribute, and would therefore be treated as one
political committee for limitation purposes.
89. Regulation § 110.3(a)(1)(iii). Indicia include:
(A) Ownership of a controlling interest in voting shares or securities;
(B) Provisions of by-laws, constitutions, or other documents by which one entity
has the authority, power, or ability to direct another entity;
(C) The authority, power, or ability to hire, appoint, discipline, discharge, demote,
or remove or otherwise influence the decision of the officers or members of an
entity;
(D) Similar patterns of contributions;
(E) The transfer of funds between committees which represent a substantial portion of the funds of either the transferor or transferee committee, other than the
transfer of funds between the committees which jointly raised the funds so transferred.
The proliferation of national, state and subordinate party committees is dealt with
separately in the 1976 Amendments. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(5)(B) (West Cum. Supp.
1977); Regulation § 110.3(b). Concern over proliferation of party committees is particularly
grave because party associations are subject to more liberal limits on expenditures coordinated with party candidates. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 44la(d) (OVest Cum. Supp. 1977);
Regulation § 110.7; FEC Opinion of Counsel to Congressman Michael T. Blouin (March
19, 1976) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
To mitigate this problem, the FEC regulations treat the national party committee and
any political committees "established, financed, maintained and controlled" by it as a
single political committee, Regulation § 110.3(b)(1); and a state party committee and
all local, county, district or regional party committees that have been "established,
financed, maintained or controlled" by it are considered as a single political committee.
Id. § 110.3(b)(2)(ii). "Established, financed, maintained or controlled" would be construed
as meeting any or all of the indicia noted above. The presumption of operation as a
single political committee may be rebutted for a subordinate state party committee if
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Thus, the "cordon sanitaire" appears effectively to ensure the integrity of the candidate contribution restrictions without impermissibly abridging a donor's rights of expression through, and association
with, a political committee. Because these provisions regulate the
relationship between donors or committees and the recipient candidate, the "cordon sanitaire" does not suffer from the same overbreadth
as the limits on donations. In addition, the "cordon sanitaire" does
not prove underinclusive, as it focuses on transactions that carry the
potential for actual or apparent corruption. The 1976 Amendments'
limitations on donations fulfill no essential function in stemming
evasion of the candidate contribution ceilings and, therefore, cannot
survive the last stage of Buckley's strict scrutiny test.
C. Limitation of Total Contributions and Strict Scrutiny
The 1976 Amendments reenact verbatim the 1974 Amendments'
restriction on total annual contributions made by an individual. 90 As
donations clearly fall within the Act's definition of "contribution," 9 '
an individual's donations must be applied against his $25,000 ceiling.
In light of the analysis in Buckley, this new reach of the aggregate
limit raises serious questions as to its constitutionality.
Buckley had sustained the restriction in the 1974 Amendments. The
Court found that it functioned as a loophole-closing device:
[T]his quite modest restraint upon protected political activity
serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by
a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of
money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked
contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that
candidate,
or huge contributions tb the candidate's political
92
party.
While the $1,000 and $5,000 ceilings on candidate contributions were
interpreted to encompass "direct, '9 3 "earmarked,"94 and "coordi(i) it receives no funds from any party unit other than its own state party committee,
and (ii) it does not contribute in cooperation, consultation or in concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, any other party unit. Id. § 110.3(b)(2)(ii)(A), (B).
90. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 U.SC.A.
§ 44la(a)(3) (%Vest Cum. Supp. 1977).
91. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. 424 U.S. at 38.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(a)(1)(A), (2)(A), (7)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(6) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(a)(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
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nated"9 contributions, the ceilings did not deal explicitly with the
opportunity for abuse inherent in large unearmarked contributions.
Apparently, therefore, the Court regarded the $25,000 ceiling as an
inoffensive global limitation upon these contributions unrestricted
elsewhere in the Act. So construed, the $25,000 ceiling was "thus no
more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation
[which had been] found to be constitutionally valid." 96
The reenactment of the $25,000 limit in the 1976 Amendments, accompanied by the restrictions on "contributions" to political committees, creates constitutional difficulties which were not present
before the Buckley Court. To the extent that the $25,000 ceiling includes donations that cannot be considered contributions to a particular candidate, the reenacted provision suffers from the same overbreadth as the limitations on donations themselves.9 7 Furthermore,
even if the provisions limited only candidate contributions, the 1976
Amendments and FEC regulations provide less restrictive means to
serve the very governmental purpose which the Court identified in
upholding the $25,000 limit. 98
The $25,000 ceiling, therefore, cannot be adequately justified as a
95. 424 U.S. at 46-47. See p. 964 supra.
96. 424 U.S. at 38.
97. See pp. 966-68 supra. It might be argued that, if limitations on donations were
held unconstitutional, donations should still be restricted to $25,000 per year to stem
the appearance of corruption fostered by the funneling of massive amounts of money to
political committees. Such an appearance could arise, for example, if a generous contributor to the national party committee were appointed to an ambassadorship by the
recently elected president.
This rationale fails, however, for precisely the same reason that the Buckley Court invalidated the limit on independent expenditures. The donor's gift, to be excluded from
the $1,000 contribution ceiling, must not have been coordinated with or controlled by
the successful presidential candidate. Any appearance of corruption in the above hypothetical derives from a generalized identity of interest between the donor and the
candidate (e.g., party affiliation), and not from any special contributor-candidate relationship. Such a generalized identity of interests exists whenever an individual donates
to a cause-the NAACP or pro-life movement, for example-which the candidate also
supports. In striking down the limitation of the 1974 Act on independent expenditures,
the Buckley Court specifically found that the appearance of corruption stemming from
such generalized identity of interests was not sufficient to justify the curtailment of
First Amendment activities. Even in the case of a spender who actively advocates the
election of a candidate, the Court noted that "[tjhe absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."
424 U.S. at 47. The Court concluded that the independent expenditure limit "thus fails
to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of
corruption." Id. at 47-48. Thus, under the Buckley reasoning, no cognizable appearance
of corruption would be created by donations that do not constitute contributions to
federal candidates.
98. See pp. 968-70 supra.
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device to close loopholes in the candidate contribution limitations.
Arguably, however, the annual limit serves a governmental interest
different than that identified by the Buckley Court: it might purport
to reduce an individual's total impact on the political process through
candidate contributions, rather than his impact upon any particular
candidate. This interest could accord with the purpose of the Act, as
found by Buckley, to stem the actuality or appearance of corruption.9 9
For example, the restriction prevents contributors from selecting and
supporting an indefinite number of "bloc" candidates (e.g., all pro-big
business Republican or pro-labor Democratic candidates). Were the
Court to find such a purpose, the $25,000 limit would not be underinclusive; nor could it be replaced by equally effective but less intrusive regulations. The provision defines by its ceiling its desired
effect and brings all corruptive influence within its reach.
But, even with this redefined purpose, the $25,000 ceiling would
be radically overinclusive with respect to donations, since not all
donations can be classified as candidate contributions. This provision,
like the other contribution limits, must focus upon the relationship
between contributors and candidates, not on that between donors and
political committees. For this provision to survive Buckley's strict
scrutiny analysis, the terms of its regulation must directly and narrowly promote the government's redefined interest. Hence, the $25,000
limit must be construed to restrict only donations that fall within the
Act's or FEC regulations' criteria for direct, indirect or constructive
contributions to a candidate. 100

Conclusion
Vital political expression and association, accorded the strongest
constitutional protection in Buckley, cannot be suppressed in the
service of administrative efficiency. Even though the government's
purpose in regulation is weighty, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties. Because
donations are not inherently corruptive, because their restriction does
not directly advance the government's interests, and because other
measures are more closely tailored to correct evasion of contribution
ceilings, the 1976 Amendments' limitations on donations are unconstitutional.
99. See p. 962 & note 51 supra.
100. See pp. 968-69 supra.
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